Marketing Based Evidence
Practicing medicine based on best available evidence seems obvious, but this has not always been done. Because medical decision making has in some cases been based on tradition or parochial convention, the recent trend has been to try to base decisions on objective evidence. This should mean all evidence. Real “Evidence Based Medicine” means that, as physicians, we are professionally charged and morally bound to intellectually consider ALL evidence; prospective, retrospective, local, and global, and evaluate it ALL for its strengths and weaknesses, and then do our best to arrive at a composite best decision for each individual patient.
What we have instead come to is “Evidence Based Marketing”. Because industry, and particularly the pharmaceutical industry, now controls funding of much of medical research, continuing education, and academic administration, they can exert heavy influence on just what “evidence” is promoted in medical decision making. Either through financial influence, and/or naïveté, some academicians and community doctors are willingly complicit in the process, and the honest efforts of the many who are not complicit is tainted in the process.
This has reached a crisis level in the design and promotion of numerous “Phase IV” trials offered by innumerable practices with little experience and no motivation beyond reimbursement and marketing themselves as “study centers”. The financial benefits of such practice is nowhere to be found in the patient’s informed consent, but to those who know the true nature of such efforts, it is that financial impact that has given rise to the vulgar title of “pharmawhore” to such doctors. This moniker isn’t entirely accurate. The doctor has not become the drug company’s “whore”, but rather its “pimp”. Just as a real pimp often sells young girls into prostitution with promises of glamorous careers in modeling or acting, these doctors literally sell their patients to drug company marketing interests under the illusion that they are participating, and may benefit from, some noble new research into new treatments. The financial relationship between the pimp and the “customer” is never fully disclosed to the patient, and they are never aware that the primary purpose of the “study” is to find new markets for insanely expensive products. It is the emergence of Avastin as not only a wildly effective treatment of various retinal conditions, but also its extreme cost-effectiveness, that has shattered the carefully cultivated paradigm that retinal pharmacotherapeutics can legitimately be obscenely expensive. Avastin threatens the prospect that drug companies can literally drain government and third party payer coffers, and the marketing of lucrative “Phase IV” studies to mercenaries is just one tactic in the pharmaceutical industry’s onslaught of medical care.
This is both shameful and unnecessary. The pharmaceutical industry may not be the miracle workers they make themselves out to be, but they do create many valuable therapies, and even without resorting to mendacity and even fraud, they could be a successful and well-respected industry. Instead of honoring their public responsibility, however, they deny it by preying on the very society that gives them their raison d’être.
Let’s make an analogy. The pharmaceutical industry has given us Prilosec, a very useful drug for gastric hyperacidity. When its patent was due to expire, the same company came out with Nexium, which is Prilosec. The only difference is that Prilosec is the racemose mixture and Nexium is the more active isomer. On a dosage adjusted per weight basis, they are the same thing. (The other difference of course is the exorbitantly higher price of Nexium). The company benefits greatly through deceptive marketing that conceals this basic truth.
Or consider Lucentis, the ultimate “me too” drug, in that the original “me” version was never even promoted for an obvious use. The maker of Avastin either did know, or had the responsibility of knowing, that it would be expected to be safe and effective for macular degeneration, but they elected not to even test it. They did of course know that they had already priced it for cancer treatment in doses of several hundred milligrams every 2 weeks at a price point of around $50,000.00 per case per year. They also knew that eye treatment would require only 1 mg. or less and so there would be little revenue stream for this application. Although there was already extensive safety data from the cancer data in systemic doses hundreds of times higher, they elected to not even test Avastin, suggested that it was unsafe, obfuscated its potential claiming it was “too big to work in the eye”, split the molecule that they had every reason to think would work, do some (as it turns out unnecessary) modifications and bring it out with a new name and a price of $2000.00 per 0.5 mg. vs. $5.00 per mg. for the parent drug. I say unnecessary because independent testing showed Avastin to be so obviously effective from the very first patient, and so obviously reproducible with hundreds of thousands of other patients, that it has become the clear standard of care around the world for both effectiveness and cost effectiveness. Although the company has refused any sponsored research comparing the two forms of this same drug, it now seems apparent from hundreds of thousands of off-label uses that the parent drug works safely and may be stronger and longer acting, as we would expect since the derivative product clears the eye too quickly. This company touts as its slogan that they are “Bringing our vision of science to the science of vision”, but it would be possible to argue that what they are really best at is “Bringing the science of marketing to the marketing of science”.
Now for the analogy. The Chrysler Corporation essentially invented the minivan back in the 1980’s. They had a great product, which they marketed well and from which they profited immensely. It was appropriate, legal, and to be expected that other carmakers followed suit, and a high quality, affordable market was born. What if Chrysler had the same anticompetitive protections as the drug companies? They certainly also spend millions on development, and they have as much or more external pressure as the pharmaceutical industry and the same claim of their importance to society. After all, who cares if society is well medicated if everyone is starving for lack of transportation to work? What if they could have patented the minivan concept? Then they would have a 17 year monopoly, at the end of which they could alter it slightly, rename it, and essentially renew the monopoly. Or, what if they could say, “Well we’ve got this great car for the commercial use, but it would never work for individuals, so we’ll change the color and increase the price 50-fold for private individuals only”?
Well, that is exactly what is happening. The very industry that could be leading the charge toward excellent and affordable health in the USA is in fact the single biggest force driving the system to bankruptcy. They are literally looting the system as fast as they can. Am I exaggerating? Hardly. Let’s take the Lucentis example again. Aside from the question of whether it ever needed to exist at all (which it now clearly did not), just how egregious is the pricing? If cancer patients were charged for Avastin what eye patients are charged for Lucentis, each dose of Avastin would cost around $500,000.00. That’s each dose, given every 2 weeks, just for this one drug. How is this not surreally greedy and irresponsible? As another metric, consider that in recent surveys as many as 79% of doctors, out of responsibility to do the best for their patients, choose Avastin over Lucentis. In spite of this, Lucentis cost close to $1,000,000,000.00 (that’s 1 BILLION dollars) in 2007 alone. That is just one drug and it is just for about 20% of only one of the many conditions that can be treated with this. This drug is injected and so comes out of Medicare Part B. One billion dollars is over 20% of the entire 4.6 billion dollar CMS budget for all of eye care in the US. This budget is under extreme and increasing pressure, and is currently scheduled for a 40% decrease from 2008 to 2012 before considering the draconian cost of Lucentis. It is clear that the same public benefit can be safely achieved from perhaps $10,000,000 worth of Avastin. During this same time, the maker of Lucentis (and Avastin) is seeking through misleading direct-to-consumer marketing and outright coercion of compounding pharmacies to increase the market share of Lucentis drastically. If this agent was used according to labeled use for AMD, this one indication alone would cost about 5 billion dollars, more than the entire budget for all of eye care. They simultaneously claim that we must NOT use Avastin since it is “off label” and claim that we can use Lucentis in lower “off label” dosing. The hypocrisy in interpreting available data is breathtaking.
This Lucentis story is only for AMD, only for new yearly cases of AMD, and Lucentis is only one of many exorbitantly priced drugs in eye care. Another company makes a sustained release implant containing a 10 dollar amount of steroid for which they charge $18,250.00. Furthermore, Lucentis is just one drug in just one disease, in just one fragment of one specialty. Unbelievably, the documented examples in psychiatry, cardiology, gastroenterology, and emergency medicine are even worse. We are literally looking at the wholesale looting of the US health care system by the most anticompetitive, government protected, and government infiltrating industry in American history.
Redefining “Medical Evidence” for marketing purpose-
How do we get from “Evidence Based Medicine” to “Evidence Based Marketing”? How is the thought process transmogrified? In a word, subtly. Through careful marketing, industry has subtly changed the rules about what research to follow to an audience only too happy to be told what to do and/or paid to go along. Frankly, it is easier to be told what to do than deciding for yourself through an independent reading of the data. You just need to trust the source, which for some is the drug company and for others is the “Key Opinion Leader” being paid by the drug company. Unfortunately for industry and its minions, the practice of picking and choosing data breaks down when one overplays one’s hand. Although this process has been insidious, the Lucentis story demonstrates such an amalgam of greed, licentiousness, and illogic that we must now address that which has become untenable.
In the retina world, Evidence Based Marketing succeeds with the help of certain “myths” that have been promoted since the marketing of Visudyne. They are promoted by many in the drug industry and sponsored research community. These issues are exactly those used by corporate advocates and parroted by a surprising number of doctors fearful of bucking the corporate sponsored party line.
A governing theme is the growing “myth” in recent years that only prospective randomized clinical trial data is real data. This, along with the more insidious myth that corporate sponsored randomized controlled trials (CSRCTs) are just as legitimate and unbiased as independent RCTs (IRCTs), seems to imply that retrospective data is useless. In other words, the myth implies that we can never learn anything useful or normative from past experience. If one can completely and categorically dismiss past experience and, through seizing financial control of the R&D pipeline, govern prospective data management, then one can define the “evidence” that governs future care according to one’s marketing plan. That is exactly what has been happening, and either out of fear of industry power or gratitude for millions of dollars of “Direct to Consumer” marketing, the mainstream media has been only too pleased to go along.
Contrary to these myths, there are some basic truths about RCTs and retrospective or experiential data that we need to consider. Frankly, it is easier to follow the crowd. It is easier to assume that any data from an RCT is unimpeachable and that any other data is useless, but we cannot afford to be that lazy. We are professional caregivers and with that responsibility, we need to consider and critically evaluate all data and recommend to our patients treatments based on all evidence. I am not suggesting that we consider retrospective data in preference to prospective data, only that we are responsible for critically analyzing ALL data according to its strengths and weaknesses. That is what Evidence Based Medicine requires and what Evidence Based Marketing seek to prevent.
We therefore need to take a hard look at the soft underbelly of corporate sponsored RCT data:
Myth #1- All RCT data is equal and inherently unchallengeable.
Truth #1- RCTs are only as good as the premises upon which they are based and the questions that they ask. If insightful, honest, non-leading questions are designed, it is more likely that useful, normative data will be gained. If uninsightful, or worse, self-serving questions or premises are employed, then it is easy to manipulate RCT data and alter the apparent outcome. The data, although statistically legitimate, can be made to only answer the questions and suggest the outcomes that you want it to. One example of course is found in of the absence of questions about histopathology in the original PDT studies and the decision to redefine “visual success”. As another example, the experiential data on Avastin is so strong that it is virtually impossible to imagine that the brilliant, creative, and careful people at Genentech could have missed its utility unless they intended to. Although this is only speculation, it makes the parallel Lucentis development look like a contrived effort to circumvent the pricing of 1 mg. of Avastin for ophthalmic use, when the price of hundreds or thousands of milligrams had already been fixed for oncologic use. It is now abundantly clear that the premise upon which Lucentis was developed, that Avastin would not work in the eye because the molecule was too large, is wrong. Whether intended or not, this false premise abrogates the need for Lucentis to exist at all. Ironically, the only value of the Lucentis trials is to indirectly suggest that its analog Avastin is probably also safe and effective. The unintended implication of the Lucentis trials, and particularly the PIER trial9 which shows poor utility of Lucentis in dosage frequencies that seem to work with Avastin, is that Lucentis may indeed be inferior to Avastin regardless of price.
Myth #2- Any treatment can be evaluated in an RCT.
Truth #2- Only simple standardized and relatively non-skill-intensive treatments lend themselves easily to an RCT. Treatments that cannot be easily standardized, particularly skill intensive procedures, are difficult to study in an RCT. There are many treatments that have become standard care without the benefit of a prospective trial, such as insulin, penicillin, and now Avastin, where experiential data decisively removes doubt as to safety and utility. There are other examples of therapies, especially surgeries, for which trials span generations of surgical refinement and end up not recommending techniques that had subsequently became unequivocal standards of care because of refinements not included in the study design. The evolution of diabetic vitrectomy in spite of marginal DRVS data stands as one example.
Myth#3- Pathologic conditions are nonvariable and therefore the spectra of severity and pathologic character do not affect the quality of prospective studies.
Truth #3- Pathologic conditions are highly variable, and RCTs are actually only useful in studying very specific conditions within a disease spectrum. Beyond that, we as physicians have a longstanding tradition and a very legitimate responsibility to use our insight, best judgment, and past experience to apply what we have learned from data available to us, whether from an RCT or elsewhere, as we treat patients suffering from a wide variety of disease types. In point of fact, RCTs can only provide basic direction , and individual and reported past experience is far more valuable and far more appropriate data to use in addressing the wide variability of disease that we encounter, variability that is not specifically addressed in the RCT.
Myth #4- RCT data is valid and retrospective data simply is not. We should therefore only consider prospective data (uncritically) and ignore retrospective data (categorically). This is a myth that drug companies have fought hard to promote in regard to CSRCTs in recent years, and incredibly, it is the most common argument I hear from those who choose Lucentis over Avastin.
Truth #4- RCT data when critically analyzed for its strengths and weaknesses is valuable, as is retrospective data. We simply need to critically analyze and use data for what it is, not giving it greater weight than is deserved (as by those who uncritically accept RCT data and only RCT data), and not ignoring any data that is carefully collected. The whole subdiscipline of Bayesian analysis considers the validity of outcomes based on the application of conditions retrospectively. Our most legitimate use of RCT data is to use it within its limitations and to use our best judgment and experience to make treatment decisions for our patients. A compelling recent example of course is again the situation with Lucentis and Avastin. The limited RCT data that is available says that Lucentis is safe and useful in the treatment of exudative AMD. The drug company, its minions, and those unwilling to accept the responsibility of practicing true evidence-based medicine would seem to like us all to leave it at that. The problem of course is that we know that Avastin exists and that it is in fact the “parent” analog of Lucentis and therefore might be expected to act similarly. We have individual and reported experiential data that says not only that it works but that it works astonishingly well with no sign of unexpected adverse effects. We have the further burden of knowing that it works so well as to raise the possibility that the antibody’s developer should have been able to know this before pronouncing it useless, legitimizing the analog’s development that in retrospect seems like little more than a strategy to circumvent pricing regulations. We have the unsubstantiated but likely possibility that the smaller molecular weight size of Lucentis may in fact be a liability, causing it to have too short a duration of effect compared to Avastin, possibly allowing a disease to smolder and that this may promote fibrosis and less durable treatment effect. Finally, we have the knowledge that many patients have significant financial exposure with Lucentis, when all available clinical data suggest that they can have the same or better effect with Avastin at a miniscule fraction of the cost and with, in our best judgment, the same degree of safety. Theoretically, Avastin might even be safer, since the smaller Lucentis molecule has more rapid and higher peak clearing into the systemic circulation. We are responsible for ALL of this data, and morally we do not have the luxury of letting those with a financial interest do our thinking for us. Reasonable people may conclude that the best evidence-based decision is to use Avastin over Lucentis, unless comparative studies, prospective and/or retrospective, suggest otherwise.
Ironically, Genentech may be the strongest believer of all in the retrospective Avastin data. It is only on the basis of this data that they could reasonably refuse to study Avastin head to head with Lucentis, believing (as seems reasonable) that Avastin would be shown to be at least as good and possibly superior to Lucentis at about 1/100th the cost per case. This is of course only speculation.
Myth #5- Independent RCTs (IRCTs) and Corporate Sponsored RCTs (CSRCTs) are identically nonbiased and provide identically unimpeachable data.
Truth #5- RCTs in general are limited by the quality of the questions that they ask and the elegance of the studies used to answer them. Consequently, no RCT is above critical analysis. Furthermore there is growing evidence in multiple medical disciplines that CSRCTs are significantly prone to bias and should be subjected to even more diligent scrutiny, especially considering the financial pressure to produce profitable products,. This was recently reported in regard to psychiatric drug testing 12.We have already discussed the Visudyne example, where the pragmatic definition of visual success and neglect of now obvious macular toxicity were beneficial to the acceptance of a marginal therapy. To this, we should add the question of whether Lucentis ever needed to be developed at all.
A New Standard of Care
With the emergence of nonselective VEGF inhibition, the standard of care in the treatment of wet AMD and other exudative maculopathies has changed abruptly and decisively. Because of the volume of retrospective data and the ubiquity of experience throughout the retinal world, Avastin has become the de facto standard against which all other treatments, including Lucentis, must be compared. Why is that? Because the de facto Avastin standard was set first. To put it colloquially, by the time Lucentis came along, the Avastin cow was already out of the barn. There are many precedents for rapid adoption of de facto standards of care. These include aspirin, insulin, penicillin, and many surgical procedures, to name just a few. Although its own maker appears to have made a conscious effort to ignore or even suppress its use in the eye, Avastin’s impact on various maculopathies is equal on an historic scale to these other examples. That it is the standard of care is well established in the ASRS 2007 Trend survey, published in November of that year.
Looking back on the various recent treatment developments for AMD, one of the things we have learned is that rapid and complete inactivation of the neovascular sequence seems to be extremely important for long term visual success. Without this, the neovascular and/or fibrotic processes continue, resulting in worsening vision and lower success rates after conversion to more effective therapy. We have learned that PDT actually causes damage to the surrounding “normal” RPE and choriocapillaris on a scale comparable in some patients to thermal macular ablation, at least with infrared thermal laser 1-3. To this, we must add the risks of cataract and glaucoma associated with intravitreal triamcinolone, since “unprotected” PDT is even more clearly risky and inefficacious.
Like PDT, Macugen use is associated with continued visual loss in most patients and expansion of vascularity and fibrosis within the lesion8. The speculation is that this is due to the inability of VEGF165 inhibition to completely stop the neovascular process. Early data on studies of Lucentis9 suggest that decreasing the frequency of injection from 4 weeks to three months is associated with progression of the neovascular process. Perhaps because of its small molecular size and rapid clearing from the eye, its fairly brief duration of effect may allow progression of the neovascular/fibrotic process in the same way that Macugen’s selectivity mitigates its effect.
The experiential data on Avastin suggest that it causes an extremely rapid and complete cessation of neovascular activity. Furthermore, this effect seems to last at least two months in most patients. Although this needs to be quantified, we have seen noticeably less submacular fibrosis on exam and OCT than has been typical in Macugen or PDT treated patients. Histologic, Dynamic ICG, and ERG studies, both reported and in our practice, show none of the anatomic or functional disruption that is now well documented with PDT. We have also seen none of the choriocapillaris devastation, central scotomata, or florid vascular regrowth after Avastin treatment that is common after PDT.
All of this supports nonselective VEGF inhibition as the new standard of primary care and of Avastin as offering the best combination of safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness. Initially, some payers required that patients fail with the older, and now clearly inferior “conventional therapies” before they would cover Avastin, but this is becoming rare as more and more have recognized the Avastin standard. We also see suggestions to continue using Macugen as maintenance after nonselective anti VEGF “induction”. This seems senseless, and appears to be a contrivance by Macugen advocates to find some use for a drug that is more likely to become an historical anecdote.
A Crossroads for Research-
In spite of this revolutionary change in our understanding of the neovascular process, and in spite of the growing acceptance of Avastin as the de facto standard of care for exudative maculopathies, many continue to describe PDT and Macugen as “standard” or “conventional” therapies for AMD. Furthermore, some researchers have so far continued to recruit patients for company-sponsored Phase IV studies that place PDT and Macugen as primary therapies or anchor therapies in combination protocols. Neither of these practices has any logical basis in the era of nonselective anti-VEGF therapy. These studies are based on a standard under which continued visual loss is acceptable, a standard which continues to be promoted by makers of inferior drugs, including providing material compensation to doctors who assist in these efforts. This practice has no justification other than to preserve revenue stream at patient expense and to benefit doctors through compensation and illegitimate research “prestige”. We simply cannot ethically continue to recruit patients into studies that we know will cause tissue destruction or indolent continuation of the disease process or where we expect vision loss to continue when we know that those same patients can receive safe, cost-effective treatment that causes no anatomic or functional harm and from which we can expect a higher rate of predictable and rapid improvement in vision.
We are at a crossroads that demands a complete re-evaluation of our investigational goals. Nonselective VEGF inhibition is not a cure for neovascular and exudative maculopathies, but it is vastly superior to any of the older treatments still in use. This is not to say that those older therapies cannot have an adjunctive role, although that may not be likely especially for the more invasive and expensive ones. What it does mean is that the visual and anatomic effect of non-selective VEGF inhibition is no longer an unknown. The early prospective data on Lucentis is definitive, and the retrospective data on Avastin is so strong that an RCT to evaluate its effect compared to natural history or the effect of PDT or Macugen would not be ethical. There are suggestions that Avastin may be superior to Lucentis as to its duration of effect, and of course it is obviously and vastly superior in its cost-effectiveness. The relative utility of Avastin vs. Lucentis is still quantitatively unknown however, and since both have clearly similar safety and efficacy profiles, it is scientifically reasonable and ethical to compare them in a prospective trial. If nothing else, the vast positive experience with Avastin far exceeds the pilot data on Lucentis patients that the company determined was adequate to mandate further study.
Given the overwhelming experience with Avastin, even the head to head study seems destined only to confirm what we already know. Even if it is completed, it is best to do it independently. Genentech has been quoted in the national press on three different continents as saying that they will never support a comparative trial with Avastin. Given the recent concerns over bias in company sponsored RCTs, an independently funded and administered RCT would have more legitimacy, and Genentech’s noninvolvement may actually be an advantage.
In spite of all this, research as an extension of the marketing effort continues. With the imbroglio created by Genentech’s recent efforts to force Lucentis use by restricting Avastin availability, the ASRS leadership has finally and laudably taken a stand against such behavior. At the same time though, the 2007 ASRS “academic” program can best be describes as a celebration of corporate marketing and industry directed and funded “paint by numbers” research. Although a healthy majority of retina specialists in the trend survey use Avastin over Lucentis, a huge majority of presentations focus on expanding usage of Lucentis. Why is this? Is it because Genentech will support Lucentis studies and researchers but not Avastin studies? They will even offer free Lucentis and support to any Avastin study willing to switch. The sequence is to promote Lucentis research, support reporting that research at sponsored meetings, and then sit back while KOLs and, hopefully as many lemmings as possible, claim that we must use Lucentis because “that’s what the study was done on”. It is untenable that even as our “leadership” meets with Genentech to force the issue on this one question of Avastin availability, that they simultaneously organize the yearly marketing party for the companies that would like to control our every move.
Patients at Risk and Informed Consent in the Age of Evidence Based Marketing-
I recently had the pleasure of seeing a new patient. This gentleman is a truck driver and relies on bilateral vision for his profession. He had seen another local retinal specialist four months previously and was correctly diagnosed with an occlusion of a venous branch in one eye and vision loss to 20/200 from related swelling. Although a moderate occlusion like this would have had an excellent chance of responding to available therapies, he was told that these were not an option, and that he should wait until a study using Lucentis. He was not told of the other options nor was he told that the doctor would be paid handsomely for enrolling him in this study. He became disenchanted and came to our office for a second opinion. One month after treating him with a single dose of Avastin and limited focal laser, his vision is improved to 20/20, enough to renew his CDL and resume driving.
Is that what we’ve come to? Withholding treatment purely to make patients our pawns to make more money? As in all professions, there always have been and always will be doctors who are primarily financially motivated. This used to be the exception. The physician as patient advocate used to be the clear norm. This norm is now at risk.
Guidelines for informed consent have been extensively studied and developed, and we need not discuss them here. The principle is that the patient has a right to know what is going on with his or her condition, and what are all the implications of all therapeutic options for himself, for the doctor, and for whoever else is in the equation. This is not happening when doctors fail to disclose the financial impacts of all treatments, including their financial or other material relationships to different therapies or vendors of those therapies. We need to discuss how the informed consent process is subjugated to marketing needs. In the example above, the patient was clearly used so that the doctor might benefit from the drug company. In countless other examples of patient care, education, and research, financial conflicts of interest are rampant. These are detailed in numerous books on the subject, the references and ordering links to which can be found in the book section of The Physicians for Clinical Responsibility website at www.clinicalresponsibility.org .
This is what patients have the right to know.
- • All of the usual data on the risks and benefits of every available treatment including off label treatments.
- • A serviceable understanding of the nature of off label therapy in normal medical practice.
- • The costs to insurance, themselves, and even society of each option.
- • Any financial differences to the doctor for each treatment.
- • ANY financial or material relationship that the doctor may have with any entity related to each treatment option.
- • If the patient is being recommended into a treatment study, they should know not only the risks and unknowns related to that study, but also any financial impact to themselves OR THE DOCTOR related to that study.
New Imperatives-
So, what imperatives are we faced with? Many, it would seem. We clearly have a new standard of primary care in the treatment of exudative AMD. The AMD story serves as but one example of many, many moral difficulties that we are currently facing. We should re-evaluate and possibly suspend ongoing studies based on therapies that are clearly inferior to the new standard or that accept continuing vision loss as a “successful” endpoint. We should look at the design of new studies and define success endpoints based on what we know we can achieve in practice today rather than on the inferior standards set by PDT and Macugen. We should think hard about allowing research goals to be so strongly influenced by corporations. The alarming practice of corporate sponsors displacing local IRBs and serving as their own overseers should be banned entirely. Corporate participation of course is vital to medical progress, but this needs to be focused on public welfare and not only shareholder welfare. Pharmaceutical companies have a public responsibility unlike, say, a textile maker. They should be held accountable to the public interest and not be free to consider only their shareholders’ interests. Perhaps this needs to be regulated by better independent or governmental oversight. Finally and perhaps most importantly, we need to take more responsibility for the financial as well as clinical well being of our patients. Too many retina specialists have rationalized using expensive and sometimes inferior therapy by arguing that ‘the government is paying for it anyway’. When we have good data that a vastly less expensive off-label therapy is as good or better in terms of safety and efficacy, that is irresponsible. The system is our system, and if we don’t respect it, or worse, if we actively or passively assist corporations in manipulating the system for their financial benefit, then we have hurt our patients and the system in which we must all co-exist. The potential market cost of Lucentis used according to the RCT protocol is around 10.1 BILLION dollars per year for new AMD cases alone, and probably over three times that including other applications, when the budget for all of eye care is 4.5 billion and scheduled to decrease to 2.6 billion over the next 4 years! With the emerging discipline of evidence-based medicine, we have useful tools that will help us to demonstrate what therapies are most effective in our patients’ own estimation, and also which are most cost-effective. Time-tradeoff techniques and QALY based effectiveness analysis are emerging as powerful tools that will place in stark perspective the actual value of therapies that are marginal in terms of effect or cost compared with those that are vastly more effective and cost-effective. Current recommendations such as passage of the Sunshine law, pooled funding for CME and research, and a return to more humble, physician-centric, and sponsor independent society functions are vital first steps. The climate has changed forever, and it is time that we accept this and adapt.
References:
- 1. Schmidt-Erfurth, U., Michels, S., Barbazetto, I., Laqua, H., Photodynamic effects on choroidal neovascularization and physiological choroid. IOVS 2002; 43: 830-841
- 2. Schmidt-Erfurth, U., Meimeyer, M., Geitzenauer, W., Michels, S., Time course and morphology of vascular effects associated with photodynamic therapy. Ophthalmology, 2005; 112: 2061-2069
- 3. Augustin, AJ., Schmidt-Erfurth, U., Vertiporfin therapy combined with intravitreal triamcinolone in all types of choroidal neovascularization due to aged related macular degeneration. Ophthalmology, 2006; 113:14-22
- 4. Sharma S, Brown GC, Brown MM, et al. The cost-effectiveness of photodynamic therapy for fellow eyes with subfoveal choroidal neovascularization secondary to age-related macular degeneration. Ophthalmology. 2001;108:2051-2059.
- 5. THE COST-UTILITY OF PHOTODYNAMIC THERAPY IN EYES WITH NEOVASCULAR MACULAR DEGENERATION-A VALUE-BASED REAPPRAISAL WITH 5-YEAR DATA. Evidence-Based Ophthalmology. 7(3):148-149, July 2006. Busbee, Brandon MD
- 6. Powerpoint ref
- 7. Sternberg, P, Lewis, H Photodynamic therapy for age-related macular degeneration: a candid appraisal American Journal of Ophthalmology 2004 ; 137, (3): 483-485
- 8. Gragoudas, ES, Adamis, AP., Cunningham, ET. Jr., Feinsod, M., Guyer, DR., for the VEGF Inhibition Study in Ocular Neovascularization Clinical Trial Group. Pegaptanib for neovascular age related macular degeneration. NEJM, 2004; 351: 2805-2816
- 9. PIER Study
- 10. Questions Over New Eyesight Drug That May Be As Good As Older, Cheaper One, Andrew Pollack, New York Times, June 29, 2006
- 11. The international intravitreal bevacizumab safety survey: Using the internet to assess drug safety worldwide Anne E Fung , Philip J Rosenfeld and Elias Reichel . Published Online: 19 July 2006. doi:10.1136/bRITISH JOURNAL OF OPHTHALMOLOGY.2006.099598
- 12. Pharmaceutical industry sponsorship and research outcome and quality: systematic review Joel Lexchin, Lisa A Bero, Benjamin Djulbegovic, Otavio Clark: BMJ 2003;326:1167-1170 (31 May)
RediscoveringCharacter in Medicine
I recently had the pleasure of seeing a new patient. This gentleman is a truck driver and relies on bilateral vision for his profession. He had seen another retinal specialist four months previously and was correctly diagnosed with an occlusion of a venous branch in one eye and vision loss from related swelling. Although a moderate occlusion like this would have had an excellent chance of responding to available therapies, he was told that there was no treatment, and that he should wait until a study of an obscenely expensive new medicine was available. He was not told of the options nor was he told that the doctor would be paid handsomely for enrolling him in this study. He became disenchanted and came to our office for a second opinion. One month after treating him, his vision is improved enough to renew his CDL and resume driving.
Is that what we’ve come to? Withholding treatment purely to make patients our pawns to make more money? As in all professions, there always have been and always will be doctors who are primarily financially motivated. This used to be the exception. The physician as patient advocate used to be the clear norm. More and more doctors now consider this to be naïve and sentimental.
After all, this is the new millennium. Technology is king, and why shouldn’t doctors share in the windfall? Doctors see surreal incomes among executives in the business world, just as their own compensation is scheduled to decrease dramatically while the cost and risks of practicing soar. This is especially true in the pharmaceutical industry, the darling of Wall Street and the very industry most accessible to physician involvement. It is natural and tempting to ask, ‘Why not me?” After all, if physicians drive health care, why not be paid by the industry that fuels so much of it? If doctors diagnose and treat illness, why not get paid to implement the plans of an industry that works to “define” new illnesses and new “needs” for its products. If doctors do research and if industry is rapidly taking over control of what is studied and how it is studied, why not become a paid mercenary in this process? If industry is so eager and financially capable of funding healthcare, and all physicians have to do is accept the argument that industry’s intentions are good, well, why not just give in? It’s convenient and rewarding and, hey, you can’t fight it anyway, right?
The problem with giving in is that with each step, the patient becomes more of a commodity and a pawn instead of the focus of our service. Giving in betrays that which defines the character of the physician. We simply cannot do that and continue to be a healer, teacher, advocate, and care giver to our patients.
Giving in to profitable complicity with the pharmaceutical industry, or any other industry for that matter, betrays the fundamental ethical difference between the practice of medicine and the practice of business. This is not to suggest that one is right and the other wrong, only that they have different ethical constructs that are fundamentally different. The business ethic accepts that the businessman or woman will act so as to promote his or her business. The business person is expected to be honest but not so altruistic as to prevent making a profit. The relationship with the client is an adversarial negotiation in which a product or service is provided for the highest price that the market will bear, and the consumer’s admonition is to beware lest the price and/or quality of the transaction not be ideal.
The physician’s ethic is entirely different. His or her relationship with the patient is not adversarial, but one of advocacy wherein the physician is expected to serve the patient’s best interests at all times. The defining role of the physician is to be an advocate, to be wary on behalf of the patient and not to be that of which the patient must beware. The physician is to work to make the patient healthy and less reliant on therapy, not more so as is the goal of any pharmaceutical marketing department. There is the expectation that the patient will not be taken advantage of physically or financially or be subjugated to the interests of the physician or any industry agent.
The pharmaceutical industry is a hybrid. It is a business entity and can be expected to behave like one. Unlike other industries though, it trafficks in the health of its consumers, and therefore has a responsibility to the public trust. This industry used to be faithful to that trust, but now increasingly only pays lip service to it. On the whole, the industry has run amok and pragmatically betrays its responsibility to the public when it is financially expedient to do so. Such a charge may seem extreme, but there are countless examples of drug companies justifying outrageous pricing or marketing and research practices as being consistent with their “responsibility to shareholders”.
Although physicians have a right to make a comfortable living, they are obligated to refuse profiteering and even racketeering at the patient’s expense. The medical profession, like all professions, has some members whose primary goal is personal profit. The majority have higher goals, but many have none-the-less followed an insidious slide into the hands of corporate and especially pharmaceutical interests. Like many “slides”, it starts innocently enough. A T-shirt at the Academy booth for listening to the pitch. Later, maybe the company sponsors a dinner for you and your referrals, some nice CME, and of course you pick a topic that flatters the sponsor, or at least doesn’t criticize them. Later they ask you to give a talk with an honorarium and travel expenses, and again the talk appropriately expresses your gratitude. Then maybe a trip to be on the advisory board, and finally the big time: you are asked to be on the “research team”, but of course they own and control the analysis and presentation of the data. You don’t like that, but what the heck. It’s great for the practice, and “everyone is doing it anyway”. It all seems okay, you guess. The only trouble is,
It’s not.
It leads insidiously to full complicity with the marketing efforts of industry at the cost of the patient’s well-being. This complicity comes at many levels. The most self-evident is through the promotion of new, patented (and therefore more expensive) “me-too” drugs of dubious value, through direct-to-consumer marketing and the provision of samples to cajole doctors to use these agents. Another more egregious example of complicity is industry manipulation of the research process wherein they have an inappropriate influence on what to study, how to study it, and how to integrate the research process with the marketing plan.
Stories from the trenches-
In the world of retinal medicine, the ultimate me-too drug is Lucentis, an agent so outrageously priced that if it was used just for new cases of Macular Degeneration according to the company’s protocol, it would each year cost more than twice the entire 4.7 billion dollar Medicare budget for all or eye care. I will use the Lucentis debacle as an example of how the ethical practice of medicine has been compromised.
Complicity over what to study-
Genentech developed a true wonder drug with Avastin. It was originally approved and marketed to treat colon cancer and has now been expanded to other cancers in doses of 500 to 1500 mg. IV every two weeks. The pricing was set such that a cancer patient could be expected to pay around $50,000.00 per year. The drug is actually a bivalent antibody that blocks abnormal blood vessel growth and would be expected to work very well for abnormal vessel growth in and under the retina. Normally, if a drug might show potential elsewhere it would be tested, but Avastin was not. It had already been priced at about $5.00 per milligram for cancer therapy, and inexplicably it was kept out of sight. Instead of testing it, it was claimed to be too large to penetrate the retina, creating a plausible reason to split a molecule that already worked, rename the active fragment and give it a new name and price of $2000.00 per half milligram! Retina doctors hired to do the company sponsored research were pleased to go along. Even developing Lucentis required an incredible break in logic, which is beyond the scope of this essay, but which is detailed below.
Complicity over how to study new drugs (and what to report or not report)-
This example comes from the development of Photodynamic Therapy (PDT) using Visudyne, a drug that ushered in the era of exorbitantly expensive retinal therapies with marginal efficacy. Histologically, PDT does some very bad things to the retina that can explain why vision doesn’t improve more often and in fact why PDT often causes significant visual harm. Although the ability to detect this existed at the time, original studies did not focus on histologic effects. In fact, histologic study with OCT was not only ignored, post-treatment study data was not even collected for three months after the treatments. Subsequent work shows that PDT with Visudyne causes immediate, nonselective devastation to the neovascular membrane and surrounding tissue. The original lesion is actually widened by the treatment, and eventual aggressive neovascular recurrence may occur. The original studies were performed by researchers who, in many cases, were paid with company stock options. Without the suppression of this data, and the redefinition of “visual success” to include 3 lines of vision loss, it might have been more difficult to even get this drug approved and marketed.
Complicity over how to treat patients-
Back to Lucentis, the ultimate me-too drug. In spite of all attempts to obscure it, Avastin was independently found to be safe and phenomenally effective. In most surveys, 70 to 80% of retina surgeons in this country and nearly all in other countries use Avastin in preference to Lucentis. Even so, almost a billion dollars is spent annually on Lucentis for what can be accomplished with less than a million dollars worth of Avastin. So what are the incentives to use Lucentis? Fear, misinformation, and money. The company has spared no effort to promote Lucentis over its own parent compound, from inception to the present. They offer free Lucentis to any Avastin study willing to switch, but will offer no free Avastin for any purpose. They have used their paid speakers bureau to spread scare tactics about using Avastin off-label, while they simultaneously support off-label studies and use of Lucentis. (Keep in mind that any use of Lucentis less than every 4 weeks is “off label”.) Beyond that, there is a built-in $100.00 per dose inducement to use Lucentis over Avastin because CMS will pay 106% of wholesale price, which is over 100.00 for Lucentis at $2000.00 per dose and virtually nothing for Avastin at $10-30.00 per dose. This means that for every 40 patients a doctor commits to Lucentis every 4 weeks, he or she makes an extra $50,000.00 per year. Recently, Genentech offered a program that would pay doctors up to $40,000.00 per quarter if they showed an increased use of Lucentis and if they agreed to deny having any knowledge of the program to outsiders! They called this a “rebate” program, although the recipients were doctors who were already profiting from using Lucentis, rather than payers and patients, who continue to get milked.
Redefining Character in Medicine-
That is a lot of money. In spite of that, most doctors continue to use Avastin. Why? Because it is the right thing for the patient, and most doctors are still committed to doing the right thing for their patients. The Lucentis story is repeated countless times in this current era of industry controlled medicine. Still the question remains: what defines the physician’s ethical imperative? What defines the physician’s character? Is the doctor’s primary responsibility like the businessman’s, to maximize profits for him or herself, or is it to be an advocate, even an activist, for patients regardless of the prospect of greater personal gain?
Clearly, the ethical practice of medicine demands the latter. This is not to say that medical care must be free, but it does mean that the doctor must:
- ♣ Act on analysis of all available data, not just what companies sponsor and promote
- ♣ Weed out company bias rather than promote or even benefit from it
- ♣ Stand up for the patient in the face of business imperatives that use patients to maximize profits by pushing more expensive me-too drugs, such as Lucentis, with exorbitantly higher prices but no greater benefit
- ♣ Resist the mindset that Big Pharm can define new illnesses for the sole purpose of selling drugs to treat them.
Physicians need to return to and maintain a higher ethic. The physician’s imperative is to be the most knowledgeable and therefore most powerful protector of the patient’s interests in the face of business’ quest for profit. It is not to use his or her knowledge and power to subjugate their patients’ interests by becoming an agent of business in the exploitation of their patients. It is just that simple and every priority of the physician must follow from that, whether in patient care, medical education, research, or public advocacy.
There has been a recent wave of sentiment that physicians should be free and independent of “Big Pharm” influence. That is not enough. The pharmaceutical industry provides valuable products (sometimes), but its primary purpose is to generate profits. It is to be the darling of Wall Street. The industry is expected to push the envelope of honesty in marketing, research, and development. It is to be expected to challenge consumers to beware. That is its nature.
It is not enough to be “Pharm Free”. The physician and physician groups are charged to resist those business purposes in the advocacy of their patients. This requires an abstention from corporate complicity for doctors in practice. Practice means patient advocacy. Alternatively, doctors can work for industry, but this needs to be transparently and fully understandable by even the most casual observer.
Doctors in research or education can and should serve the public interest. They must serve the medical and lay public. They should also advise their corporate partners in matters of medical integrity. With full disclosure, doctors can work for industry, but they are still responsible by their medical oath and by their charge as physicians to serve that same public interest. Corporate and independent research can coexist productively if both are presented and understood for what they are. The public’s interests cannot be served if bias is obfuscated or concealed in any way.
A registry of all physician financial involvement in industry can be in no way objectionable, since it would serve only to provide transparency. The data is readily available, from industry who must retain such record to administer their programs, and from physicians who should be eager to demonstrate their independence, if it exists. Only those with something to hide could object. Without their participation, their “secrets” would come to light by virtue of their absent data.
The current system of simply replacing independent research with corporate sponsored research is a broken system. It ignores proven bias in corporate research and naively ignores the effects of corporate interest. This must be replaced. All acknowledge the need for independent research and medical education. Most would agree that industry should help support truly independent research and education given that medical care is the medium in which these corporations profit and find their reason to exist. Corporations could be required to contribute, according to annual revenues, to a pool of funds that would be independently administrated by independent medical professional organizations and patient advocacy groups.
We have had several years in which the system has been gamed and manipulated to serve corporate interests. We could regain integrity by simply dissembling that system and returning to the system where physicians and healthcare workers control medicine and are supported by industry rather than the other way around. We need to do this now, before the healthcare economy has been completely funneled into industry coffers and before we have lost all credibility with the public.
We Are All Retarded
I have many patients who are “retarded” by the conventional definition. They are some of my best friends. That term, “retarded”, is not descriptive. It is pejorative. It is ignorant. It is, well, retarded. The term implies that these people lack something that one must have to be whole. It is true that they depend on us for material needs, but the wisest among us depend on them too. Of course they lack some reasoning and problem solving skill, but not as much as many think. It is not the intellectual skills that they lack that defines them. It is the lack of guile, and there is a lesson for all of us in that.
We write-off retarded people as being empty. We cannot possibly understand all of the things that they face. It is easier for us to simply assume that they are empty and that they therefore face no struggles. By assuming that they perceive little, we can conclude that they contain little, and that allows us to ignore them as irrelevant. I have had few other patients who take in so much and bear so much with such grace. They are assumed to have receptive limitations, but their real challenge is often expressive.
No, they are real people, and they bear the same things that we bear. They bear what we do and so much more, and they do it with so much less. They rebel sometimes and express frustration, but they rarely complain. When something works, when something goes right, they are typically so much more joyful than we ever are. When one’s life is punctuated by constant failure, the successes are that much more delightful.
Einstein, near the end of his life, said, ‘we don’t know a fraction of a percent about anything’. That is an expression of humility from one of the most perceptive men ever known. It is also an expression of wisdom. The wiser we are, the more we know of our deficiencies. Einstein’s statement is also instructive. In the scope of all that can be known, we really don’t know a fraction about anything. Our fields of study have never yet defined even a scrap of the nature within that field, much less other fields or how it all fits together. Kierkegaard said that the more we understand, the more we come to understand that there is that which cannot be understood. The wisest know that real understanding is for God alone. The rest of us can only “look through a glass and darkly”. The least wise among us think that they have command in their world, and they seek to command through coercion and force. Even when they mean well (viz. past and current crusades and the current American hegemony), they are the source of much evil and much suffering.
So in the greater scope of things, we are really not so different than those we consider to be “retarded”. We are all retarded; the only difference is the degree and the manner in which we are so. Those we consider conventionally retarded need our help with certain functions of living, but they can teach us much about love and persistence and joy. Providing such assistance may be frustrating for us, but we should not be too condescending. You may be an expert in one area, and if I try to function in that area, I may be just as frustrating to you, but you will probably not be condescending to me. Or you may! This can be a real impediment even for “normal” people as we try to relate in the “real world”. The point is, we are all really in this together, even our “retarded” colleagues, and if we can just realize this, our interactions can be so much more fruitful and enriching.
What retarded people lack most is the guile and ambition that the rest of us so commonly inflict upon each other. What they often excel in is patience and forbearance, things that all of us could use more of. So, maybe we should try not to be so “retarded” in dealing with the retarded. Maybe we should stop, look, listen, and see these people for what they are. It doesn’t take any more time. In dealing with “retarded” people, it usually takes longer to hurry. We should settle down, take a breath, offer some help, and gratefully enjoy the rewards. Hopefully, we will deserve it, at least a little.
Slip Sliding Away
At a recent local society dinner in our town, the speaker, a local retina guy, announced that he had no financial ties to any of his material, and then proceeded to give an infomercial for numerous company-sponsored “studies”/marketing ventures, each with financial relationships and some with the promise of consulting and speakers fees . When I pressed him on the point, he explained that he was “just an employee” of his practice, and therefore he had no disclosure obligation. The speaker’s partner suggested that I should keep quiet because “everyone (including me??) is doing it anyway”. That got me thinking again about the various conflicts of interest that have become so commonplace in the retina world today. I posted an essay about such ethical issues last year and received voluminous and unanimously encouraging feedback including a nice note from one of the patriarchs of the ASRS who decried “the pathetic slide of our profession into the hands of the drug companies”.
It has been a slide. Like many “slides”, it starts innocently enough. A T-shirt at the Academy booth for listening to the pitch. Later, maybe the company sponsors a dinner for you and your referrals, some nice CME, and of course you pick a topic that flatters the sponsor, or at least doesn’t criticize them. Later they ask you to give a talk with an honorarium and travel expenses, and again the talk appropriately expresses your gratitude. Then maybe a trip to be on the advisory board, and finally the big time: you are asked to be on the “research team”, but of course they own and control the analysis and presentation of the data. You don’t like that, but what the heck. It’s great for the practice, and “everyone is doing it anyway”. It all seems okay, you guess. The only trouble is,
It’s not.
It’s often so hard to see where that line is and whether or when you’ve crossed it. Indeed, there is much discussion about “the line”, but most seem to agree that there is one and our profession has slipped well across it. The Lucentis/Avastin drama provides an excellent case study. I had a long conversation a few months ago with an associate professor of a major eye institute and his Genentech “handler”. We discussed many of the ethical facets of the Lucentis/Avastin debate, and as they were both expressing their personal belief that the two drugs were equivalent, the doctor explained to me that, in any case, he was “only a scientist” and as such had no obligation to address “the business ethics”. That was a real eye opener for me. He seemed oblivious to his glaring conflict of interest and only too willing to absolve himself of its very existence.
As I have been involved in the national discussion regarding the Avastin/Lucentis controversy, I have had conversations with various bioethics leaders on the role of the drug companies in affecting the independence of medical practice and research. This is not particular to the retina world. Here is how it often works (as summarized from “On the Take”, by Jerome P. Kassirer, MD):
A company has a new product for which they need Phase III or Phase IV data. They recruit willing doctors to whom they pay up to several thousands of dollars just for signing up a patient and then more for collecting the data. The data BELONGS, by contract, to the company. The company takes the data, ghostwriters write what favors the company and they often conceal whatever data doesn’t suit them. They then attach some or all of the names of the hired docs to the ghostwritten paper and have it published. Since the study is designed to favor the drug, and since negative data is often suppressed, it is often not true science but rather more of a marketing project that looks scientific. It’s a win-win. The company gets their product out, marketed in a way that looks like legitimate peer-reviewed development, and the docs get money and a little prestige as well. After that, the docs may get more money to be on the speaker’s bureau to promote the product. Since there are innumerable combinations of products out there now, there is virtually no limit to how many marketing projects can be made into such “research”. The crux here is that docs are paid a sufficient premium that there is an inducement to go along with the company on care decisions and data management that could compete with patient welfare. Since over the last decade or more the government has stepped back from funding clinical research outside of the NIH, companies are only too willing to pick up the mantle and fit “research” into their marketing plans. As physician reimbursements have come under increasing pressure, it has become tempting to replace perceived lost patient care revenue with drug company revenue. And why not? “Everyone else is doing it anyway.”
Don’t take it from me. Consider the books “The Truth about the Drug Companies”, by Marcia Angell, MD, and “On the Take”, by Jerome P. Kassirer, MD, both former Editors in Chief of NEJM. The first considers the manipulation of the drug development and marketing process by the drug companies and the second deals with physician complicity in this process. Both books should be required reading for anyone who seeks to be informed about the conflicts of interest in clinical care, research, and medical education.
The ophthalmology and retinal specialties were not deeply explored in these books, but our issues are very much on the battleground that they discuss. It is virtually impossible to find a meeting where speakers’ are not compromised by financial conflicts of interest. Many colleagues have written to me in the past year that it is hardly worth even going to meetings anymore since so much of what we hear is nothing more than advertisement for the speakers’ various sponsors. It would be easier if the speakers just wore NASCAR style jackets emblazoned with their sponsors’ logos. The drug companies’ influence is pervasive even beyond overt sponsorship. I was recently to give a talk on some of these ethical issues, but five minutes before speaking I was asked to change my topic because one of the companies had just given a large sponsorship check for the meeting.
Call me sentimental, but I still admire research that is done to gain unbiased knowledge, and I miss the time when our academics and “opinion leaders” never needed to explain (or euphemize) their financial interests at meetings and in papers. The financial conflicts that Dr. Kassirer talks about in his book are rampant in the retinal world.
There is a very good reason for this growth of corporate sponsorship of physicians. Over the last five or more years, there has been increasing downward pressure on physician reimbursement. Simultaneously, since the precedent of obscenely priced retinal pharmaceuticals was ushered in with Visudyne, drug costs have been eating into the Part B revenue pie. This has come to a head with Lucentis. Few dispute that Lucentis and Avastin work very nearly identically, and many suspect a primarily financial motivation for Lucentis’ development. Nonetheless, by the company’s own estimates quoted in the recent Wall Street Journal article, Lucentis should take close to 1 billion dollars from the Medicare Part B budget for eye care in 2007. This is about 20% of that budget right here and now, and it creates a virtual certainty that physician reimbursement and patient benefits will suffer accordingly. One option for physicians is simply to sell out, jump on the bandwagon, and replace lost patient care revenue with Big Pharm payoffs. These are available in the form of payment for corporate controlled research, marketing, speaking engagements, and the like. There is even a $100.00 per dose inducement to use Lucentis over Avastin, since CMS pays 106% of AWP, which is about $100.00 more for Lucentis than Avastin. And why not just give in? “Everyone is doing it anyway”.
And what about the patients? Well, they’re on their own, aren’t they?
What about research? Real research still happens; it’s just obscured by ever increasing volumes of corporate research that is too often designed to serve marketing interests at the expense of scientific interests. Even if good research is done by those who accept compensation from drug companies, that financial conflict makes it impossible and impractical to discern which data is biased and which isn’t. Even the good, nonbiased data is tainted by the possibility of undetected bias. Before all these financial intrusions, we didn’t have this problem. Furthermore, research that doesn’t support marketing interests is often spurned. Take the head to head CATT study. This is being done without any corporate help because Genentech publicly admits that it will support no research on Avastin because “it is not in their best financial interest” (personal communication with a Genentech executive who will remain unnamed). So much for bringing a vision of (true) science to the science of vision. Maybe Genentech should change its motto to “Bringing the Science of Marketing to the Marketing of Science”.
What of our societies and our academic “leaders” and “opinion shapers”? It would be nice to think that biased research happens only in the less regimented world of private practice, but it doesn’t. Many, though certainly not all, of our academicians and “leaders” are hugely affected by financial conflicts of interest. It is no longer possible to go to a website or even a journal that is not affected by the infamous “unrestricted grant” from one or more corporations. In this context, “unrestricted” too often means, “spend this grant on what you want, but if you ever want another one, don’t displease us”. This has made it difficult for doctors who want to practice good medicine with reliable information. There is still a significant quorum of our peers who want nothing more than this, to practice good, evidence-based medicine in the best interests of their patients. How do we find unbiased information and teachers? Who can we trust? How can we connect with government in a sincere attempt to provide good and cost effective care? How can we advocate for patients and keep our health system solvent?
We must find answers to these questions in the decade to come. In spite of the apparently impregnable fortress of “Big Pharma”, I hope that we can decide that patients are more important than shareholders or various individuals’ consulting deals. I think we need to speak up and act out. I have heard many, many insightful and deeply ethical thoughts from many colleagues since I first joined this discussion a year ago. I think we need to make a stand and let the chips fall where they may. Truth tends to eventually bubble to the surface against all odds. New therapeutic development is vital, but unbridled marketing hubris has gotten out of control. “Opinions” that are crafted and purchased to serve corporate interests often just don’t make sense for the public welfare. We need new opinions that serve the interests of patients and society, and if that means we need new “opinion leaders” who are willing to serve an ethic of truth over financial expedience, well that wouldn’t be so bad.
In the spirit of providing a forum for discussion of these issues, several physicians have created a website and a grass roots organization called Physicians for Clinical Responsibility. This is meant for physicians who have decided not to enter into financial interests that might conflict with patient interests. This essay and several earlier ones as well as news articles and links to Dr. Kassirer’s and Dr. Angell’s books are on the www.clinicalresponsibility.org website. I invite you to take a look, sign up to be a member of Physicians for Clinical Responsibility and even leave a comment or cosign any of the pieces on the site. If you agree with the content, say so. If you disagree or have other input, say so. The independent literature there speaks for itself. The members’ essays are not intended to be dogmatic and certainly are not intended to be inaccurately critical. If there are inaccuracies, please post corrections. The intent is simply to catalog opinions in a dedicated clearinghouse, stimulate input, and create a forum for concerned members of the medical profession.
A Dispatch from the Front
Although the format of this essay is fictional, every item reported and every vignette is true and documented. Stories about patients are altered only to protect privacy, but are verifiable with the patients’ permission.
From: Retinal Field Agent Supervisor, North American Office
To: The Corporate Pharm Central Command
RE: Current Harvest Update
I am pleased to make this report to the Central Pharm Command. We are making excellent progress on all assignments: Research and Marketing Coordination, Education and Infomercialism, and Decision Support/Mind Control. We have had particular progress from our Thought Leaders, which provides a clear indication that our increased recruitment and Thought Leader Liaison efforts are paying off. Although the Retinal Field represents only a small portion of the overall Medical Pharm, it controls an important crop. Vision is more important to patients than any other bodily faculty other than life itself. The Retinal Field comprises two of the most threatening conditions threatening the growing population of seniors in our region, and to paraphrase the old saying, “When you’ve got ‘em by the eyes, their minds and hearts are soon to follow.
I would like to separate this progress report into our three main projects: Education/Infomercials, Research and New Product Promotion, and Clinical Mind Control.
Education/Informercialism-
We are making great strides in this area. This is of course closely tied with our research and new product promotion efforts, but even on its own merits, education control has become an invaluable tool for controlling retinal therapy. At the time that we set the historic paradigm of expensive treatment regardless of utility (The glorious “PDT revolution”), we were in control of barely one-fourth of educational programs. I am very proud to announce that at the last annual meeting of the American Society of Retinal Specialists meeting in Cannes, France (an opulent venue that was only possible with our financial support), of the 123 speakers listed in the program, only two had no corporate financial relationships. Furthermore, although our doctors are required to disclose financial relationships, we have continued to successfully conceal the details and extent of those relationships. Although we have succeeded in making many influential Thought Leaders very “grateful”, they are (amazingly) still able to claim academic “independence”. Since we have been recruiting more rank and file docs to quasi-research activities, our audience is finding it convenient to accept these claims. Although there is still an irritating cadre of docs who object to this system, they have for the most part kept quiet, perhaps feeling overwhelmed by our relentless efforts. We think this insurgency may be in its last throes. We have also had excellent success with our peripheral seminar programs. The Avastin “stumbling block” has posed a real threat to our plans by shattering the paradigm that there is no safe, effective, and cost effective AMD treatment. Still, even in this environment, we have sponsored many successful promotions of our expensive, ineffective alternatives by setting up “expert panels” to talk about promotional “studies” as if they were real science. Even when we present legitimate data on moot questions, it is accepted as if the information was necessary. It’s amazing. We had a very well attended Macugen Seminar in Las Vegas, which went off very well. We really think we can milk more blood out of this turnip if we can just continue to discredit the enormous safety data on Avastin. Fortunately, it has so far eluded the gullible that it is illogical to suspect a stroke risk for a milligram or less of Avastin or Lucentis when oncologists use 1000 mg or more with no such concerns. The uncritical acceptance of Thought Leader messages such as this continues to amaze us, but we are happy nonetheless.
In addition to the traditional meeting format, we are thriving in the paid vacation market. Through our ever tightening liaison with societies, smaller physician groups, and our own users groups, we are hosting innumerable meetings at exotic locations. Each issue of the “throwaway journals” contains too many testimonies of our success in this area to even count.
Research/New Product Promotion-
We are truly enjoying “Perfect Storm” conditions with our research efforts. The coincidental development of governmental budget restraints and the era of retinal pharmaceuticals could not have come at a better time for us. As government research money has become scarcer, we have been able to step in and, in effect, purchase the loyalty of entire departments. We have even been able to fund entire professorships for some of our more loyal promoters. Furthermore as personal incomes for academic and private doctors has come under pressure, they have eagerly welcomed our offers of income replacement without all of the requirements of documentation and performance verification that they are faced with in actual patient care. Many, especially community researchers who have signed on to our various “research by numbers” programs actually seem relieved when we demand to retain and control their data. The brilliant idea to usurp IRB functions is especially attractive to our less experienced recruits.
The sheer volume of these activities is promising for two reasons. With one of our newer projects, we have been able recruit well over 200 “research centers”. This has created a true win-win. The centers, which are completely under our control, are able to create the illusion of research activity for their local marketing efforts. We are able to control data with a research “team” that is too large to ever organize in any way that could threaten our goals, and we have a built-in critical mass of practices that will use our products regardless of what the data may show.
There is no great risk there, because we can control “what the data may show”. This is simply due to the fact that we have been able to take over the design process of the studies on our products. We have created an environment where approval does not require that we show, or even know, everything about our products. We merely have to collect enough data to say something nice about them. We can even control what “nice” means! With the Visudyne study, we redefined success to include three lines of visual failure. We also elected not to look at early OCT data, so we were able to disregard toxicity data that, unfortunately, is now well documented in the literature and in medical experience.
We have also had wonderful success with Lucentis. This was made possible by simply proposing that the already safety-tested, approved, and priced parent drug would not work. We have taken the “me-too” drug phenomenon to a glorious new level. By justifying the development of Lucentis without even considering the parent, we were able to bring the “me-too” fragment out for a new indication and effectively enjoy the revenue burst on the same drug twice! It has been a miracle. We have largely survived a significant threat to our plan when Avastin was independently “discovered”, and we were able to maintain the illusion of need well enough to secure expedited FDA approval for Lucentis. Even though our revenue on Lucentis is only 1/5th what we had hoped so far, we have been able to redirect almost a billion dollars from the CMS eye care budget directly into our coffers. This is over 20% of the CMS budget, but fortunately that is not our problem. Perhaps if Medicare becomes insolvent, we will be able to replace conventional independent physician compensation altogether.
Clinical Mind Control-
We are making real progress with our mind control program. Of course the loaded CME programs and carefully directed research designs are instrumental in this, but we are also making real headway in the trenches as well. A few examples follow:
We have had significant success lately in deflecting Avastin usage toward Lucentis. We make over $15,000,000.00 for a volume of Lucentis the size of a soda can, so we can well afford to provide free product for any study willing to “go our way”. Among these projects are studies of Lucentis on various retinal vascular diseases that already unequivocally respond to Avastin. Although the following is the story of “one that got away”, there is a message of hope hiding within. We had a recent account of a patient in one of our practices with a simple vein occlusion, readily treatable with either laser or Avastin. Our guy successfully disparaged these options and withheld them in favor of waiting for an expensive trial of Lucentis. This would have all gone well for the benefit of our doctor and us, but the patient, a truck driver who needed his vision, grew impatient. He went over to a “dark side” practice that has resisted our efforts and received Avastin and a limited grid laser. One month later, he had improved from 20/200 to 20/25, good enough to resume driving. Although this one got away, it provides clear evidence that our phase IV efforts on Lucentis may allow us to recover some of the revenue we lost due to the unfortunate Avastin discovery.
Just today, we had a report of a patient who was seen by a general ophthalmologist, who had taken one of our luxury junkets for the quickie Lucentis how-to courses designed to circumvent actual retinal specialists. Well the doc was just itching to play retina doc because, as we’ve pointed out, you can make a lot of money injecting Lucentis. Mind you, the patient didn’t even have macular degeneration, but that is part of the point of marketing to non-retinal specialists and directly to the public. Actually, she had just popped a retinal capillary BLOWING HER NOSE! She was already getting better, but the doc was going to commit her to Lucentis at $2000.00 a shot every 4 weeks for two years. $54, 000.00 to treat something she didn’t even have, all because we are succeeding in incentivizing unqualified docs to use our stuff. It’s simply glorious. Although this one also got away to a real retina doc, it shows the great potential to increase our business even beyond the needs of real disease!
We also received word from a field operative about a patient being treated by a mere community retina doctor for AMD. The patient innocently assumed that the AMD book being marketed by John Hancock University (name changed to protect the culpable) would be a reliable resource. You are well aware of our long and fruitful relationships there, and we were pleased enough to send the booklet filled with kind words for our older products. The institution was also kind enough to supply this patient’s name and information to our Direct to Patient marketing people, and we have been inundating him with mind control materials ever since. Unfortunately, he did find out about our connection with this university because they misspelled his name, and of course all of our materials then contained the same odd misspelling. We need to correct this problem, but it is evidence of the tight marketing relationship we have with one of our flagship institutions.
Conclusion-
Yes, the future is bright indeed. There are annoying watchdog groups such as The National Physician’s Alliance, but we have alliances of our own, and we have more money. We have excellent buy-in from the major Society “players”. There are rumblings on Capitol Hill about flushing us out of our covey, but we have nurtured an unprecedented level of alliance at the NIH, the FDA, and among several friends on the Hill and in the Whitehouse. The corporate elite is alive and well. We just need to stay vigilant about these quaint populist groups. We will keep all of you at Central Command posted on events in the months ahead. In the meantime we will keep to our motto:
“Bringing the Science of Marketing to the Marketing of Science”